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The Mozambique Crisis: A Case for
United Nations Military
Intervention
Introduction
The human rights situation in Mozambique is currently among the worst
in the world, a situation some commentators have called a holocaust.
An insurgency has displaced or seriously affected almost six million
Mozambicans. Over 350,000 Mozambicans have fled the country, more
than half fleeing to minority-ruled South Africa. Mozambicans who
remain in Mozambique face starvation and heinous brutality. This trag-
edy, however, has gotten little attention from the international commu-
nity, and Mozambicans have become a forgotten people on a neglected
continent. Due to foreign military intervention, massive refugee
problems, threats of fighting spreading to neighboring states, and the
degree and scope of human rights violations, the effects of the insur-
gency have gone beyond Mozambique's borders making Mozambique's
civil war a matter of international concern. The situation will probably
not improve until the civil war ends; unfortunately, however, the war is
currently at a violent stalemate. Foreign military intervention may be
the only possible means of ending the insurgency and improving life for
Mozambique's civilian population.
Numerous nations currently provide military aid to Mozambique;
however, unilateral foreign military aid has not ended the insurgency.
Furthermore, unilateral military aid may violate international law and
disrupt the United Nations' peacekeeping function. Unlike unilateral
military intervention, United Nations military intervention could effec-
tively end the insurgency and would not violate international law;
indeed, the United Nations was designed to be the world's peacekeeper.
Increasing use of the United Nations' peacekeeping mechanisms would
increase the world's confidence in the United Nations. Given
Mozambique's political non-alignment and its urgent need for aid,
Mozambique presents an opportunity for beneficial United Nations mili-
tary intervention.
The purpose of this Note is to discuss, using Mozambique as an
example, the problems the United Nations faces in militarily intervening
in civil conflicts that have international effects. This Note also seeks to
demonstrate why the United Nations should intervene in Mozambique.
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To become an effective force for world peace, the United Nations must
have a role in ending civil conflicts that have international effects.
Part I discusses the political forces in Mozambique and establishes
that Mozambique is non-aligned politically, thus increasing the possibil-
ity of United Nations intervention. Part II describes the current situa-
tion in Mozambique for civilians, demonstrating that the situation is
serious enough to merit intervention, that the situation is largely due to
the insurgency, and that foreign military aid probably will be necessary
to end the insurgency. Part III lists the benefits of United Nations mili-
tary intervention and the drawbacks of unilateral military intervention.
Part IV discusses the hurdles to United Nations military intervention in
civil disputes, and argues that the United Nations could overcome these
hurdles in the case of Mozambique. Part IV also proposes means to
extend the United Nations' power to intervene in civil disputes with
international effects.
I. Political Forces in Mozambique
In Mozambique, which is a non-democratic nation, Front for the Libera-
tion of Mozambique (FRELIMO) has been the sole official political party
since the nation was liberated in 1975. While FRELIMO has officially
made Mozambique a communist nation,' Mozambique has recently
moved towards capitalism and towards friendship with many West Bloc
nations.2 Currently, Mozambique receives aid from both East Bloc and
West Bloc nations and appears politically non-aligned.
FRELIMO is currently involved in a violent civil conflict with the
Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO), a loosely organized
group comprised of numerous FRELIMO enemies whose primary goal
is to overthrow FRELIMO and its control of Mozambique's govern-
ment.3 FRELIMO has, however, retained control of the government
and officially continues to govern the nation.
A. The Official Governing Party of Mozambique: FRELIMO
1. FRELIMO's Rise to Power
Prior to gaining independence in 1975, Mozambique was a Portuguese
colony.4 In 1962, various groups supporting liberation from Portugal
formed FRELIMO. 5 FRELIMO developed an administrative structure
1. See infra note 19 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 20-39 and accompanying text.
3. See infra note 43 and accompanying text.
4. Portugal gained control of Mozambique in 1912. T. BRENNAN, REFUGEES
FROM MOZAMBIQUE: SHATrERED LAND, FRAGILE ASYLUM 10 (1986).
5. Id. at 11. The groups that formed FRELIMO include the Mozambican Afri-
can Nationalist Union (Manu), the Democratic National Union of Mozambique
(UDENAMO), the African Union for Independent Mozambique (UNAMI), and a
Marxist group that would come to control FRELIMO. Serapiao, Crisis of Political Legit-
imacy, AFR. CONCORD MAG.,Jan. 16, 1986, reprinted in Mozambique and United States Pol-
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consisting of political and military branches. 6 By 1964, the group was
engaged in an intensive guerrilla struggle against Portuguese control. 7
Despite early ideological disputes and the assassination of its first presi-
dent,8 FRELIMO gained popular support, military strength, and formal
recognition by the OAU ("Organization of African Unity") as the legiti-
mate representative of the Mozambican people.9 In 1974, following a
military coup in Portugal, Mozambique was granted full independence
as ofJune 25, 1975, and FRELIMO began its reign as the nation's offi-
cial governing party.10
2. A Chronological Overview of FRELIMO's Political Orientation
Since its inception in 1962, FRELIMO has experienced internal disputes
concerning the organization's proper political stance.'" Moreover,
FRELIMO's choice of political allies has been erratic, but pragmatic.' 2
The organization's internal disputes were most severe until 1970. FRE-
LIMO's radical branch, following Marxist-Leninist teachings, aspired to
end all capitalist and colonial exploitation.i 3 The conservative branch,
on the other hand, merely sought to replace the white Portuguese rulers
with black Mozambican rulers while maintaining a capitalist system. 14
Following the 1970 assassination of Eduardo Mondlane, FRE-
LIMO's first president, Samora Machel, a leader of FRELIMO's radical
branch, ascended to FRELIMO's presidency.' 5 From 1970 to 1974,
under Machel, FRELIMO received financial and military support from
icy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on African Affairs of the Comm. on Foreign Relations, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. 103 (1987) [hereinafter Hearing].
6. T. BRENNAN, supra note 4, at 11.
7. Id.
8. FRELIMO's first president, Eduardo Mondlane, was a dedicated Mozambican
nationalist who was a faculty member at Syracuse University at the time he was
elected. Id at 11.
9. Id.
10. Indeed, FRELIMO is Mozambique's only official party. FRELIMO gained
sole control because of its strength at the time of the 1974 coup in Lisbon. Id. at 11-
12. By the time of the coup, FRELIMO controlled at least one-third of Mozambique
and established political organization and military control. Id. at 12.
While FRELIMO was popular for bringing independence to Mozambique, the
population only marginally supported its economic policies. Id. Portugal's original
plan for Mozambique's independence was to have FRELIMO compete with other
groups for popular support in a democratic government, but FRELIMO's strength
and control over the region caused Portugal to concede to FRELIMO's demand for
sole control of the government. Id.
11. Gunn, Learning from Adversity: The Mozambican Experience, in REGIONAL CON-
FLICT AND U.S. POLICY: ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE 143-44 (R. J. Bloomfield ed.
1988). For the view of a radical FRELIMO member towards early disputes within
FRELIMO, see Interview with Marcelino dos Santos, First Vice-President of FRE-
LIMO, reprinted in LSM INFORMATION CENTER, INTERVIEWS IN DEPTH MOZAMBIQUE
FRELIMO (1971) [hereinafter Interview with dos Santos].
12. See infra notes 18-39 and accompanying text.
13. See Interview with dos Santos, supra note 11, at 1.
14. Id. at 2.
15. Gunn, supra note 11, at 144.
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numerous communist nations, especially China.1 6 It is unclear to what
extent FRELIMO's early communist stance was a result of aid from com-
munist nations and a lack of support from capitalist nations. Evidence
suggests that FRELIMO's radical branch may have been receptive to
capitalist ideals had capitalist nations offered early support. 17
From its liberation in 1975 until the early 1980s, Mozambique's pol-
icies were largely communist,1 8 and foreign aid came chiefly from the
Soviet Union. Mozambique solidified its status as a Marxist state when it
signed a twenty year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the
Soviet Union in 1977.19
Despite aid from the Soviet Union, Mozambique suffered an eco-
nomic crisis in the late 1970s.20 Many reasons explain this economic
collapse. First, aid from the Soviet Union was meager. 2 1 Second, FRE-
LIMO's economic policies failed. 2 2 Third, military attacks devastated
Mozambique.23 The failure of the economy ultimately led FRELIMO to
rethink its communist stance in hopes of soliciting aid from the West.24
Thus, while Mozambique continued to rely on Soviet aid, Machel
intensely lobbied Western nations for additional aid. In 1985, the
United States responded by giving Mozambique sixty-six million dollars
in non-military aid. 25 Meanwhile, other non-communist states, such as
Britain and Zimbabwe, gave Mozambique limited military support.2 6 In
addition to warming relations with capitalist states, in 1983 Machel
adopted internal economic reforms, many of which were inconsistent
16. Id. at 145. Searching for support, Machel visited the Soviet Union, Bulgaria,
Romania, and East Germany. Id.
17. See id. at 144.
18. Id at 152.
19. Campbell, Soviet Policy in Southern Africa: Angola and Mozambique, in REGIONAL
CONFLICT AND U.S. POLICY: ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE 103 (R. J. Bloomfield ed.
1988).
20. Gunn, supra note 11, at 153. While Mozambique had an economic surplus of
$41 million in 1976, by 1980 it had a $360 million deficit. Id. Mozambique is an
agriculturally rich nation, yet it was forced to import much of its food supply. Id.
21. It is estimated that the Soviet Union provided Mozambique with only $175
million of economic aid between 1978 and 1982. Campbell, supra note 19, at 107.
22. For example, the state-owned farms suffered from gross mismanagement.
Gunn, supra note 11, at 154. Productivity decreased due to the workers' lack of moti-
vation. See id.; and Hearing, supra note 5, at 103. Indeed, farm production may have
dropped 757o between 1981 and 1987. Id. at 206 (response by Edward L. Saiers to
question asked by Senator Simon).
23. See Gunn, supra note 11, at 153.
24. Id. at 155.
25. Id. at 161-62, 166. States lobbied by Machel included the U.S., Portugal,
France, Britain, Holland, and Belgium. Id. at 162.
The U.S. State Department recommended donating $1.15 million in military aid,
but this proposal was rejected by Congress. Id. at 166. Congress, evidencing its
reluctance to militarily support a non-democratic state, would only have approved
this military aid if Mozambique had agreed to hold popular elections. Id.
26. Id. at 167. For example, British officers began training Mozambican soldiers
in Zimbabwe. Campbell, supra note 19, at 107.
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with Mozambique's strict socialist system.2 7
In 1986, Machel died in a plane crash and Joaquim Chissano,
Mozambique's current president, became the third leader of FRELIMO
and the second president of Mozambique.2 8 Under Chissano,
Mozambique has maintained warm relations with the Soviet Union. 29
Because Chissano has continued Machel's policy of strengthening rela-
tions with Western nations and implementing capitalist economic poli-
cies, the U.S. and Britain have continued to economically aid
Mozambique.3 0 Chissano has also succeeded in obtaining much-needed
military support from neighboring Front Line States,3 1 and, as a result,
the Front Line forces have had some success in combating RENAMO.
3 2
27. See Gunn, supra note 11, at 160-61. For example, the Mozambican Congress
called for decentralization of planning and endorsed private shops. Id. Furthermore,
the government transferred many farms to private control and decreased price-set-
ting. Hearing, supra note 5, at 70 (prepared statement of Edward L. Saiers). See gener-
ally id. at 70-73.
A 1987 program included many of the following reforms: flexible exchange rates
for imports and exports, flexible interest rates, liberalization of exchange and trade
regimes, market-determined prices of consumer goods, reduced centralization of the
economy, and greater competition in agricultural marketing. Hearing, supra note 5, at
204-05 (responses of Edward L. Saiers to questions asked by Senator Simon).
Between 1984 and 1987 at least 30 firms were privatized. Id. at 55 (prepared state-
ment of Chester Crocker).
28. Campbell, supra note 19, at 107. The cause of the crash is shrouded in mys-
tery. Many Mozambicans believe South Africa caused the crash. Id. Machel's succes-
sor, Chissano, however, has stated that the evidence is insufficient to implicate South
Africa. Gunn, supra note 11, at 170 (quoting Chissano: "We do not know who
[caused the crash]").
29. See Gunn, supra note 11, at 172.
30. Id. Between January 1, 1987, and May 21, 1987, Britain gave Mozambique
$153 million of aid, making Mozambique the largest single recipient of British aid as
of May 21 of that year. Godwin, Mozambican Misconceptions, Wall St.J., May 21, 1987,
at 28, col. 4, reprinted in Hearing, supra note 5, at 109.
In 1985, U.S. bilateral assistance to Mozambique exceeded $43 million. Hearing,
supra note 5, at 144 (responses of Chester Crocker to questions asked by Senator
Simon). In 1987 the U.S. pledged $75 million worth of humanitarian aid. Id. at 56
(prepared statement of Chester Crocker). Between 1981 and 1987, total U.S. direct
aid to FRELIMO was $78 million, and U.S.-backed multilateral aid totaled $154 mil-
lion. Godwin, supra. By U.S. law, all economic development funds must go directly
to the private sector "[t]o the maximum extent practicable." Hearing, supra note 5, at
14 (statement of Mr. Saiers).
In 1985, 16 non-communist states economically aided Mozambique, including the
following: Australia ($1.4 million), Austria ($2.9 million), Belgium ($1.3 million),
Canada ($4.8 million), Denmark ($6.1 million), Finland ($3.2 million), France ($20.3
million), West Germany ($4.8 million), Italy ($28.6 million), Japan ($4.3 million),
Netherlands ($24.8 million), Norway ($21.2 million), Sweden ($34 million), Switzer-
land ($3.5 million), United Kingdom ($10.9 million), U.S. ($47 million). Id. at 154
(responses of Chester Crocker to questions by Senator Helms).
31. The Front Line States, named because of their proximity to South Africa, are
Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
32. Gunn, supra note 11, at 170. Between December 1986 and March 1987,
forces from Zimbabwe and Tanzania aided FRELIMO in halting a major RENAMO
offensive and retook land, highways, towns, and a bridge. Id. at 170. Zimbabwe's
military involvement has been compared to the U.S.'s involvement in Vietnam; one
report says Zimbabwe has contributed over 12,000 soldiers at a cost of over $350
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Currently, Mozambique is moving from an Eastern to a Western
embrace, having "freed itself from the grip of Soviet and East Bloc
clientelism." 33 While some commentators doubt the sincerity of this
shift,3 4 no one disputes its occurrence.3 5 At least two reasons explain
this change in Mozambique's political orientation. First, Mozambique's
socialist system simply failed.3 6 Second, Mozambique has traditionally
allowed the political inclinations of its foreign benefactors to affect its
internal policies, and Western support has increased while Soviet sup-
port has remained constant with no signs of increasing.3 7 Pragmatically,
Chissano has stated that he wishes Mozambique to be an ally of both
Eastern and Western nations.3 8 Thus, under FRELIMO, Mozambique is
in a unique position in current world politics: despite Mozambique's
official alignment with the Soviet Union under the Treaty of Friendship
and Cooperation, Mozambique receives aid from both Eastern and
Western nations and appears politically non-aligned.3 9
million. Hearing, supra note 5, at 109. Other reports of the number of Zimbabwean
soldiers aiding Mozambique vary from 6,000 to 20,000. See id. at 164 (responses of
Chester Crocker to questions by Senator Helms); id. at 195 (responses of Steven
Metz to questions asked by Senator Helms); and id. at 203 (responses of Jose A.
Francisco to questions asked by Senator Helms).
33. Rotberg, Introduction, in REGIONAL CONFLICT AND U.S. POLICY: ANGOLA AND
MOZAMBIQUE 4 (R. J. Bloomfield ed. 1988); see Hearing, supra note 5, at 52 (prepared
statement of Chester Crocker). Mozambique never fully complied with Soviet
requests, demonstrating Mozambique's limited deference to the Soviet Union. For
example, Mozambique has not given military access rights to the Soviet Union and
signed the Nkomati Accord with South Africa despite Soviet objections. Id. at 4
(statement of Chester Crocker).
34. See Hearing, supra note 5, at 34-35; id. at 189 (responses ofThomas Henriksen
to questions asked by Senator Helms); The Times (London), Mar. 7, 1987, at 6, col.
4, reprinted in Hearing, supra note 5, at 111-12.
35. See supra notes 27, 30, 33.
36. See, e.g., Gunn, supra note 11, at 153-60; Hearing, supra note 5, at 126 (pre-
pared statement of Steven Metz). A lack of economic incentives for workers hurt the
agriculture industry. See Gunn, supra note 11, at 154. Also, the state paid paltry
prices for crops produced by the private sector. Mismanagement of state-owned
farms and state buying organizations discouraged production. Mozambique's
bureaucracy was large and lacked initiative. Peasant farmers received virtually no aid.
Id.
37. Campbell, supra note 19, at 108. FRELIMO has never been content with the
level of support from the Soviet Union. Hearing, supra note 5, at 125 (prepared state-
ment of Steven Metz). Soviet aid to Mozambique has increased only "moderately"
from the small amounts previously given, and Gorbachev has not indicated that the
Soviet Union will increase aid to Third World Marxist regimes. See Campbell, supra
note 19, at 107-08. Even if Soviet aid to Third World nations were to increase,
Mozambique would probably be among the last nations to receive such aid because
Mozambique is viewed as the "weakest link" in the chain of Third World Marxist
nations. Id at 112.
38. Gunn, supra note 11, at 172.
39. See Rotberg, supra note 33, at 4; Hearing, supra note 5, at 3 (prepared state-
ment of Chester Crocker).
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B. Opposition to FRELIMO: RENAMO
In 1975, FRELIMO aided the battle against white-minority regimes in
Southern Africa by providing a launching point for guerrilla attacks
against Ian Smith's minority-ruled government in Southern Rhodesia.
These attacks forced Smith to flee.40 Smith responded by organizing
RENAMO, a group comprised largely of Portuguese speaking whites as
well as Mozambicans and other Africans discontented with FRELIMO's
faltering Marxist policies. 4 ' Although RENAMO has developed some
detailed political goals, 4 2 the group's main objective is apparently the
overthrow of FRELIMO's control of Mozambique's government.
4 3
Originally, RENAMO's support came chiefly from Rhodesia. 44 In
1980, when Rhodesia was liberated and became Zimbabwe, South Africa
emerged as a primary source of RENAMO's financial and military sup-
port.4 5 Portugal also aided RENAMO, probably in retaliation for prop-
erty lost by industrialists when FRELIMO gained control of
Mozambique. 4 6 RENAMO obtained further support from various
Islamic countries because of religious concerns. 4 7 Whether South
Africa still covertly aids RENAMO is unclear.48
RENAMO's insurgency has been notoriously brutal and effective.49
By 1985 RENAMO had over 14,000 combatants, 50 and over 22,000 by
40. T. BRENNAN, supra note 4, at 13.
41. Id.; Rotberg, South Africa's Regional Hegemony, in REGIONAL CONFLICT AND U.S.
POLICY 78 (R. J. Bloomfield ed. 1988).
42. Although RENAMO has produced a manifesto stating its goals regarding
politics, economics, justice, health and education, international politics, and a consti-
tution, the manifesto is very brief and general. RENAMO's Provisional Economic Mani-
festo for Free Mozambique, reprinted in Hearing, supra note 5, at 120.
43. Rotberg, supra note 41, at 78; Hearing, supra note 5, at 148 (responses of
Chester Crocker to questions by Senator Simon); Id at 212-13 (responses of Terry
Jeggle to questions asked by Senator Simon). RENAMO has become a catch-all for
those opposed to FRELIMO. Godwin, supra note 30, at 28, col. 4, Hearing, at 109.
44. See T. BRENNAN, supra note 4, at 14.
45. Gunn, supra note 11, at 158.
46. Id. Portugal probably no longer aids RENAMO.
47. Id. RENAMO convinced some Islamic states that FRELIMO was suppressing
the Islamic religion, which was popular in some regions of Mozambique. Id.
48. Hearing, supra note 5, at 127 (prepared statement of Steven Metz); see id. at 58
(prepared statement of Chester Crocker). Under the Nkomati Accord, signed in
1984, South Africa promised not to aid RENAMO, and Mozambique pledged not to
provide sanctuary for African National Congress forces. South Africa has undoubt-
edly violated this accord. See, e.g., id. South Africa has repeatedly attempted to
destabilize FRELIMO's control. In 1981 and 1982, South Africa attacked
Mozambique. Gunn, supra note 11, at 158-59. Beginning in 1982, guerrillas that
were "armed, trained, financed, transported, and supplied by South Africa" attacked
all ten of Mozambique's provinces. Campbell, supra note 19, at 104.
49. "Imagine California with all its roads cut, with most of its country people
driven into towns and cities, with its farms abandoned and with its huddled, defense-
less population having to be fed and clothed by air. Welcome to Mozambique."
Vonnegut, My Visit to Hell, PARADE, Jan. 7, 1990, at 17.
50. T. BRENNAN, supra note 4, at 14.
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1987.51 Its attacks have caused the collapse of Mozambique's economic
infrastructure and prevented FRELIMO from rebuilding Mozambique's
economy.5 2  RENAMO's greatest military success has been in
Mozambique's rural areas, forcing almost the entire civilian population
of Mozambique to seek refuge in the larger population centers.55 While
it is unclear whether RENAMO can actually defeat Mozambique's forces,
FRELIMO's army has little chance of defeating RENAMO without a sub-
stantial increase in military support. 54
II. The Need for a Solution
The human rights situation in Mozambique is among the worst in the
world,55 largely due to RENAMO's insurgency.56 The people of
Mozambique will continue to suffer until the civil war ends. 57 Unfortu-
nately, no end is in sight for the conflict. The strong antagonism
between FRELIMO and RENAMO, as well as the limited organizational
structure of RENAMO, makes a political solution highly unlikely. Given
the current military stalemate, a victory by either party is highly improb-
able without increased foreign intervention.5 8
A. Life for Civilians
RENAMO's insurgency, which is responsible for brutal acts against civi-
lans, along with droughts and failed economic policies have turned
Mozambique into a land of carnage and human suffering.59 It is esti-
mated that RENAMO's insurgency has displaced or seriously affected
51. Hearing, supra note 5, at 173 (responses by Chester Crocker to questions by
Senator Helms).
52. T. BRENNAN, supra note 4, at 15. RENAMO's control over key economic links
has increased Southern Africa's dependence on South Africa. Id.
53. See id. at 14.
54. Id. One report suggests RENAMO controls at least one-third of the popula-
tion. Mozamthiopia, Wall St.J., May 11, 1987, at 26, col. 1, reprinted in Hearing, supra
note 5, at 114. Another report estimates RENAMO has operated in-but not neces-
sarily controlled-only 10% to 15%6 of the nation. Hearing, supra note 5, at 193
(response of Steven Metz to questions by Senator Simon). RENAMO has claimed
control of 85% of Mozambique, although this claim seems unfounded. Id. at 213
(responses of Terry Jeggle to questions by Senator Simon).
55. See Hearing, supra note 5, at 197 (responses of Thomas Brennan to questions
asked by Senator Simon).
56. See infra notes 59-65 and accompanying text.
57. See infra notes 59-65 and accompanying text.
58. See infra notes 66-73 and accompanying text.
59. See generally T. BRENNAN, supra note 4; Gunn, supra note 11, at 158; Hearing,
supra note 5, at 127 (prepared statement of Steven Metz); Godwin, supra note 30, at
28, col. 4, Hearing, at 109. Detailed accounts of RENAMO's brutality are widespread:
In Mozambique, we saw stupefied, starving children with eyes as big as din-
ner plates, adults with chests that looked like bird cages. There was one new
twist for me anyway. I had never seen purposely mutilated people before,
who had their noses or ears or fingers or whatever cut off by hand-held sharp
instruments ....
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about six million Mozambicans. 60 Perhaps the starkest testament to the
severity of the situation is the exodus of over 350,000 Mozambicans -
over half of whom fled to minority-ruled South Africa.61 "[W]hile the
oppressive policy of apartheid in South Africa attacks human dignity and
well-being, the brutality these refugees fled in Mozambique immediately
threatened their very survival."'6 2
Mozambicans remaining in Mozambique, as well as those who have
fled, depend heavily on food and care supplied by international relief
organizations. 6 3 Two problems threaten these relief efforts. First,
RENAMO guerrilla forces have severely limited aid by disrupting supply
routes to the needy.64 Second, South Africa is generally unfriendly
towards Mozambican refugees. The South African government expelled
the International Committee of the Red Cross in 1986, thereby eliminat-
ing an "important source of material assistance and international pro-
tection for these refugees."'6 5 The inhuman asylum neighboring
countries grant to escaping Mozambicans is not a solution to the
problems in Mozambique.
B. Prospects for Peace
For numerous reasons, a political solution to the insurgency is highly
unlikely. First, FRELIMO refuses to recognize RENAMO as a legitimate
organization. This political stand would be thwarted by entering into
[C]olor the people in old photographs of Auschwitz in all shades of brown
and black, and you will be looking at what [people in Mozambique] see every
day.
Vonnegut, supra note 49, at 17.
"Heinous and widespread atrocities against noncombatants-skulls crushed,
infants boiled alive, throats slit, and women and girls brutally raped-have been
reported by numerous eyewitnesses, [and are] ascribed most [frequently] to
[RENAMO] .... " T. BRENNAN, supra note 4, at 4.
"One major factor ... worked against RENAMO's interests: its own brutality ....
Rape and the severing of breasts, ears, and lips in retaliation for non-cooperation
became common." Gunn, supra note 11, at 158 (footnote omitted).
60. N.Y. Times, Aug. 15, 1990, at AS.
61. T. BRENNAN, supra note 4, at 4. One report states that almost 500,000
Mozambicans have fled the country and almost three million have been displaced
within the nation. Hearing, supra note 5, at 197 (responses of Thomas Brennan to
questions by Senator Simon). The refugee situation in Mozambique is among the
world's worst. Id.
The drought in Ethiopia gained worldwide attention in 1984 and 1985, yet over
twice as many Mozambicans are affected by the crisis in Mozambique. Id. at 31 (state-
ment of Thomas Brennan).
62. T. BRENNAN, supra note 4, at 4.
63. Mozambican refugees typically have been treated poorly by neighboring
states; however, an overwhelming refugee presence coupled with prompting by the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has improved treatment for
Mozambican refugees. Id- at 15.
64. Hearing, supra note 5, at 214-15 (responses of Terry Jeggle to questions by
Senator Simon); id. at 56 (prepared statement of Chester Crocker); id. at 75-76 (pre-
pared statement of Edward L. Saiers); see Vonnegut, supra note 49, at 16-17.
65. T. BRENNAN, supra note 4, at 18-19.
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negotiations with RENAMO. 6 6 Second, whether RENAMO is suffi-
ciently organized to enter and abide by negotiated agreements is uncer-
tain. 67 Third, RENAMO is unlikely to cease its battle until FRELIMO
abandons control of the government, and RENAMO has not indicated
that it would settle for anything less.68 Thus, the prospects for a negoti-
ated settlement are "discouragingly dim."'69 A military victory for either
party seems unlikely. Because neither organization appears to have the
power to defeat the other, the war is currently caught in a violent stale-
mate.70 To make matters worse, RENAMO has suggested that it will
expand the war to the population centers of Mozambique and
Zimbabwe.
Mozambique is a nation in desperate need of international aid to
end the insurgency. To date, the efforts of foreign nations to end the
war primarily have entailed providing economic or military aid to either
RENAMO or FRELIMO. Such support has not brought peace to
Mozambique. Peace can only be achieved by other means. Given the
bitter antagonism between FRELIMO and RENAMO, some type of
international military intervention will be required to end the insur-
gency. Indeed, even if the two organizations enter peaceful negotia-
tions, Mozambique will need an international military presence to
maintain peace and assure compliance with any agreed upon resolution.
M. Military Intervention in Mozambique
Unilateral military intervention 7i in Mozambique has not ended the
insurgency. In addition to its ineffectiveness, unilateral intervention is
of questionable legality72 and may destabilize the region. Intervention
by the United Nations, on the other hand, would potentially be effective
in ending the insurgency and would neither violate international law nor
66. Id at 25. However, Mozambique once negotiated with RENAMO and may be
willing to do so in the future. Hearing, supra note 5, at 150 (response of Chester
Crocker to questions by Senator Simon). Some argue that FRELIMO must take
RENAMO seriously if it wishes to end the conflict, implying the need to negotiate.
Godwin, supra note 30, at 28, col. 4, Hearing, at 109.
67. "[T]here is insignificant evidence of the existence of a bona fide organization
in structural and political terms ...." Hearing, supra note 5, at 212 (response of Terry
Jeggle to questions by Senator Simon). Indeed, RENAMO's leaders are generally
unreachable. See Focus on Africa (BBC broadcast on June 1, 1984), reprinted in Hearing,
supra note 5, at 117. However, the organization does seem to have a president. See
Letter from Afonso Dhlakama to President Reagan (Nov. 27, 1986) (Dhlakama pro-
claims himself President of RENAMO), reprinted in Hearing, supra note 5, at 80.
68. RENAMO suffers from internal discord over whether it should settle for less
than a complete military victory. Hearing, supra note 5, at 194 (responses of Steven
Metz to questions by Senator Simon).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 33 (statement of Steven Metz); id. at 176 (responses of Chester Crocker
to questions by Senator Helms).
71. See, e.g., supra notes 25, 26, 30, 31.
72. See infra note 98.
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contribute to a regional cold war.7
A. Benefits of United Nations Intervention
1. Human Rights Benefits
While the region has been plagued by recent droughts, much of the
human suffering in Mozambique is caused or worsened by human bru-
tality resulting from the insurgency.7 4 Mozambique presents an oppor-
tunity to improve a horrendous human rights situation through
international cooperation. Indeed, United Nations military intervention
may be the only hope for ending "the agony of the non-Marxist, non-
capitalist, nearly naked and utterly pitiful refugees. ' ' 75 The fact that
Mozambique is currently receiving aid from both the U.S. and the Soviet
Union suggests that both Eastern and Western nations have a stake in
the Mozambican people and that the foundation for a major interna-
tional relief effort has already been built.
2. Financial Benefits
Mozambique and other nations would benefit financially from military
aid that would help end the insurgency. Many nations have spent large
sums of money to aid Mozambique. 7 6 This money has largely paid for
military supplies and necessities for those affected by the insurgency.7 7
While military aid to Mozambique-as well as financial aid to rebuild the
nation-would be expensive, an end to the insurgency would potentially
end Mozambique's long-term dependence on foreign aid.
3. Political Benefits
Many nations politically desire FRELIMO's continued control of
Mozambique's government. Unless military aid to FRELIMO increases,
RENAMO's insurgency may overthrow the Mozambique government,
replacing it with a minority-ruled South African puppet government.78
Considering that South Africa is a formal enemy of the Soviet Union and
has been condemned by the U.S., few, if any, nations would favor a
South African puppet government ruling Mozambique. South African
expansion is politically undesirable, and the re-institution of a minority-
ruled government in Mozambique is morally intolerable. RENAMO is
strong militarily; Mozambique's army, by contrast, is "intrinsically weak,
underpaid, underfed, and undermotivated." 79 Indeed, Soviet support
may be all that has prevented RENAMO from gaining control of
73. This Note recognizes that the U.S./USSR cold war has seemingly ended with
Gorbachev's reforms and the USSR's shift away from socialism. Given the duration
and intensity of the cold war and the threat of such "wars" in the future, however, the
argument that unilateral aid may increase hostilities should not be disregarded.
74. See supra notes 59-65 and accompanying text.
75. Vonnegut, supra note 49, at 16.
76. See supra note 25, 26, 30, 31.
77. Id.
78. Rotberg, supra note 41, at 87-88.
79. Rotberg, supra note 33, at 5.
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Mozambique's population centers.8 0 The army, however, has demon-
strated that with the help of foreign troops, weapons, technical support,
and advice, it can launch effective attacks against RENAMO. 8 l
4. Benefits to the United Nations
The United Nations Charter contemplated the United Nations as the
primary intervener in international disputes.8 2 While the United
Nations' past ineffectiveness has forced nations to act unilaterally,8 3 uni-
lateral intervention is both a cause and an effect of the underutilization
of the United Nations. A United Nations military presence in
Mozambique would fulfill the Security Council's duty to maintain inter-
national peace and security.8 4 Such a commitment would set an impor-
tant precedent for ending the United Nations' historic underutilization
and ineffectiveness in maintaining international peace8 5 and could
restore international confidence in the United Nations.8 6
a. Fulfilling the Duty of the Security Council
The Security Council has a duty to maintain international peace and
security.8 7 The situation in Mozambique involves a threat to interna-
tional peace;8 8 thus, the Security Council has a duty to intervene. Some
type of military intervention almost certainly will be necessary to subdue
or end the conflict in Mozambique;8 9 thus, military intervention would
80. T. BRENNAN, supra note 4, at 14-15.
81. Id. at 14.
82. SeeJ. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER, & N. LEECH, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE INTER-
NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 1304 (3d ed. 1988).
83. See id.
84. The U.N. Charter provides, "The Security Council shall determine the exist-
ence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall
make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken...." U.N. CHARTER
art. 39, para. 1 (emphasis added).
"[The U.N.] confer[s] on the Security Council primary responsibility for the main-
tenance of international peace and security, and agree[s] that in carrying out its duties
under this responsibility the Security Council acts on [its] behalf." Id. at art. 24, para.
1 (emphasis added).
85. See infra note 105-06 and accompanying text.
86. The recent invasion of Kuwait by Iraq resulted in numerous U.N. resolutions
allowing sanctions, blockades, and the use of military force against Iraq, and the
U.N.'s actions received almost worldwide approval and support. This conflict
appears to symbolize a new world order in which the U.N. will play a central role.
While such increased reliance on the U.N. is certainly a step in the right direction
towards the U.N. as world peacekeeper, further changes are needed. First, the con-
flict would have provided a perfect opportunity for use of a U.N. military body.
Indeed, while many nations have become militarily involved in the crisis, such
involvement lacks a unified U.N. command and has resulted in political disputes con-
cerning each nation's "fair" contributions to the struggle against Iraq. Second, as
this paper argues, civil disputes that lead to breaches of international peace merit
U.N. military involvement. U.N. involvement in such disputes is necessary if the U.N.
is to become a central force in world peacekeeping.
87. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
88. See infra notes 175-85 and accompanying text.
89. See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
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be consistent with the Security Council's duty.
b. Increasing Confidence in the United Nations
The historical ineffectiveness of the Security Council largely was a result
of political tensions between Eastern and Western countries. 90 The
Gorbachev era, however, has been marked by a decline in such hostili-
ties. This presents the Security Council with an opportunity to assume
its role as peacekeeper and peacemaker.91 Indeed, the Soviet Union has
become more willing to consider the United Nations in its foreign policy
decisions, and there is an increased awareness that global problems
require international cooperation. 9 2 This new spirit of international
cooperation should make the United Nations a more effective tool for
international peace. Mozambique provides an excellent opportunity for
the United Nations to restore international confidence in its peacemak-
ing ability. Because Mozambique is politically non-aligned, 93 there
should be minimal opposition to United Nations intervention on polit-
ical or ideological grounds. Additionally, the horrific consequences of
the RENAMO insurgency 94 make a compelling moral case for United
Nations intervention. A successful United Nations intervention in
Mozambique could help build faith in the organization, and this confi-
dence in the United Nations may act as a self-fulfilling prophecy,9 5 help-
ing to rectify the United Nations' largest problems. 96
B. Problems with Unilateral Military Intervention
Unilateral-or multilateral-military intervention and aid pose numer-
ous problems that can be avoided through United Nations intervention.
First, unilateral aid tends to promote international tensions. 97 Second,
unilateral military assistance may violate international law. 98 Finally,
unilateral military aid can undermine the United Nations' efforts to
resolve a dispute.
90. See infra notes 111-19 and accompanying text.
91. Tickell, The Role of the Security Council in World Affairs, 18 GA. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 309-10 (1988) (speech delivered Feb. 2, 1989).
92. Id.
93. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
94. See supra notes 59-65 and accompanying text.
95. A self-fulfilling prophecy is a "prediction about some personal or social
behavior that influences the actual behavior, so that the prophecy is confirmed by the
result that it has caused." I. ROBERTSON, SOCIOLOGY 633 (2d ed. 1981). Confidence
in the U.N. could strengthen the organization, thus justifying the confidence.
96. Confidence in the U.N. might help reduce Security Council problems such as
the veto problem, the lack of a collective security system, and lack of financial
resources.
97. A nation receiving aid may be more receptive to the donor's political and
economic policies. Indeed, the donor may condition the aid on the donee's adopting
such policies. See supra note 30.
98. The U.N. Charter prohibits all unilateral force unless it is used in self-
defense. Additionally, merely offering military aid may constitute using force. See
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. United States),
1986 I.C.J. 14, 146-50 (June 27, 1986).
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IV. The United Nations as Peacemaker
Soon after the United Nations was created, Harry Truman said:
You have created a great instrument for peace and security and
human progress in the world. The world must now use it. If we fail to
use it, we shall betray all those who have died in order that we might meet
here in freedom and safety to create it .... The successful use of this
instrument will require the united will and firm determination of the free
peoples who have created it.99
Despite the early recognition that the United Nations would become
effective only through voluntary compliance and support, the United
Nations generally has not been utilized to maintain international peace.
"Most national statesmen, while paying lip-service to the U.N .... have
done precious little to develop and dramatize the great potentialities of
the U.N. under the present Charter in the field of peace-keeping and
pacific settlement."' 10 0
Pursuant to the United Nations Charter, the Security Council 10 1 has
the "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace
and security."' 0 2 The General Assembly has a secondary role in main-
taining international peace.' 0 3 Both bodies can authorize military inter-
vention to further international peace in certain cases. 10 4
While maintaining international peace frequently requires military
intervention, both the Security Council and the General Assembly face
severe hurdles to recommending or mandating militark intervention. 1 0 5
Some hurdles, such as the veto problem and the lack of a collective
security system, 10 6 are problems unique to the Security Council. Other
hurdles for the Security Council and the General Assembly are the lack
of confidence in the United Nations, the lack of financial resources of the
United Nations, and questions regarding the legal authority of the
99. Reprinted in R. HISCOCKS, THE SECURITY COUNCIL: A STUDY IN ADOLESCENCE
55 (1973).
100. Id. at 327 (quote by Benjamin Cohen).
101. The Security Council consists of 15 member states. U.N. CHARTER art. 23,
para. 1. Five states-China, the U.S., France, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet
Union-are permanent members. Id. Each member of the Council has one vote on
all matters. Id. at art. 27, para. 1. The 10 non-permanent members are elected for
two-year terms. Id. at art. 23, para. 2.
A "procedural" matter before the Council is passed with the affirmative vote of
nine Council members. Id. at art. 27, para. 2. A "non-procedural" matter is likewise
passed with the affirmative vote of nine Council members, but all non-procedural
votes additionally require the concurrence of all five permanent members. Id. at
para. 3.
102. Id at art. 24, para. 1. Although the Security Council has the primary respon-
sibility of maintaining "international peace and security," this responsibility currently
is interpreted as being non-exclusive; thus other U.N. bodies (i.e., the General
Assembly) may assume some responsibility for maintaining international peace. See
infra note 123 and accompanying text.
103. U.N. CHARTER art. 24, para. 1; id. at art. 10, para. 1.
104. See infra notes 139, 162.
105. See infra notes 108-224 and accompanying text.
106. See infra notes 108-31 and accompanying text.
VoL 24
1991 The Mozambique CriLis 149
United Nations to authorize military intervention. This final problem -
the legal authority to authorize military intervention - is especially
troublesome in the case of civil disputes because of Article 2, paragraph
7, which limits the U.N.'s authority to intervene in matters essentially
within a nation's domestic jurisdiction.' 0 7
The United Nations potentially could overcome these hurdles to
military intervention in the case of Mozambique. In addition, many of
these hurdles would become less imposing if the United Nations took a
more active role in peacemaking, in Mozambique or elsewhere.
A. Hurdles to Military Intervention Unique to the Security Council
1. The Veto
a. Overview
Because a non-procedural proposal before the Security Council may not
be passed without the concurrence of all permanent Security Council
members,1 0 8 each permanent member has an absolute veto power over
all such proposals. Although some commentators believe the veto is
necessary, 10 9 the veto has been widely cited as a primary reason for the
Security Council's impotence. 1 1°
Use-and abuse-of the veto began soon after the United Nations
was formed. The Soviet Union believed the U.S. was using the United
Nations as a means for carrying out its own policy objectives and
responded by incessantly exercising its veto power.' By 1962, the
Soviet Union had vetoed over 100 proposals,' 1 2 and the Security Coun-
cil was unable to act in any situation involving even a slight conflict
between U.S. and Soviet interests. 1is
In the 1960s, use of the veto decreased 1 4 for a number of reasons:
warmer U.S.-Soviet relations, an increase in the size of the Council that
allowed the votes of non-permanent members to defeat proposals unfa-
107. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7.
108. Id- at art. 27, para. 3.
109. See Tickell, supra note 91, at 307, 312.
[T]he veto is vital. First, the veto, paradoxically, does more than anything
else to ensure that the United Nations bears some resemblance to the real
world and is treated seriously as an organization .... Second, the veto
ensures ... that genuine international consensus is required before an action
is taken which involves the international community as a whole .... Third,
the permanent membership of those who exercise the veto brings to the
Council a degree of continuity which it would not otherwise have.Id
110. See, e.g., R. HIscoCKS, supra note 99, at 72; T. S. BATRA, U.N. SECURITY COUN-
CIL: SNAPPING THE SNARE 31 (1977); COMMISSION TO STUDY THE ORGANIZATION OF
PEACE, STRENGTHENING THE UNITED NATIONS 4, 79 (1957).
111. R. HIscocKs, supra note 99, at 71.
112. Id
113. See T. S. BATRA, supra note I10, at 31. "In all cases in which the permanent
members had a stake, the right of using veto [sic] was unsparingly exercised." Id.
114. R. HIsCOCKS, supra note 99, at 103.
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vorable to East Bloc states,1 15 and the condemnation of indiscriminate
usage of the veto. 116 Furthermore, the "Uniting for Peace" resolution
by the General Assembly required the General Assembly to consider
and make recommendations regarding any matter of international peace
not handled by the Security Council due to a veto. 1 7 This resolution
may have led the Security Council to lessen its use of the veto so that it
could maintain its power. 81 8
Despite the decrease in the use of the veto, it remains a major hur-
dle to United Nations action. 119 While the veto problem has resulted in
a greater role for the General Assembly in maintaining peace, the Gen-
eral Assembly simply does not have the same power as the Security
Council to maintain peace. 120 Thus, the "Uniting for Peace" resolution
is a very limited solution to the veto problem, and the United Nations
will be severely limited unless the Security Council can overcome this
problem.
b. The Veto Problem as Applied to Mozambique
The question of whether the veto problem can be overcome in the case
of Mozambique-or in any case-is a political issue. The political issue
is less problematic in the case of Mozambique because none of the
Security Council's permanent members are formal enemies of
Mozambique; indeed, many of these members actually aid
115. Prior to the Council's enlargement, Western nations dominated the Council,
and the Soviet Union had difficulty in finding enough opposing votes to defeat a
Western-backed proposal. R. HiscocEs, supra note 99, at 100-01. Thus, the Soviet
Union utilized its veto power to do so. Id. Since the Council was enlarged, the Coun-
cil has typically contained a sufficient number of members willing to vote against
Western proposals; thus, the Soviet Union has defeated proposals without using the
veto. Id.
116. Id. at 103.
117. G.A. Res. 377,5 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at 10, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950).
[I]f the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent
members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General
Assembly shall consider the matter immediately ....
Id.; see R. HISCOCKS, supra note 99, at 293-94; T. S. BATRA, supra note 110, at 73-74.
It is generally accepted that the General Assembly has a secondary role in main-
taining international peace. See R. HIscocKs, supra note 99, at 288; U.N. CHARTER
art. 24, para. 1. Some commentators feel that this secondary role violates the spirit
of the Charter but is necessary. See R. HIscocKs, supra note 99, at 291-93. But it is
beyond dispute that the General Assembly has assumed increased responsibility in
maintaining international peace. See, e.g., COMMISSION TO STUDY THE ORGANIZATION
OF PEACE, supra note 110, at 238.
118. R. HIscocKs, supra note 99, at 293.
119. For example, the U.S. recently vetoed a proposal that would have allowed the
Security Council to take action against South Africa. U.N. CHRONICLE, Aug. 1986
(Lexis, Nexis Library).
120. The Security Council has the power to recommend or order enforcement
actions, which may involve the offensive use of force. See infra notes 159, 162-64. In
contrast, the General Asserbly can only recommend peacekeeping actions, which are
far less drastic than enforcement actions. See infra notes 134-35, 139-43.
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Mozambique. 12 l It is therefore possible that none of the permanent
members would veto a proposal to militarily intervene in Mozambique.
2. Lack of a Collective Security System
a. Overview
An international security force under the control of the Security Council
would greatly increase the Council's power to pursue international
peace. Article 43 of the United Nations Charter clearly contemplates
such a security force:
1. All members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the
maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make avail-
able to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special
agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities... nec-
essary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.1
2 2
Efforts to establish an international security system pursuant to Article
43 have either failed123 or produced relatively small forces.124
The failure to fully implement Article 43 poses serious problems to
military intervention by the Security Council. First, without a collective
security force, the Security Council must improvise when assembling
armed forces to take military action to secure peace.' 25 Such forces will
generally contain personnel from various nations who have not previ-
ously operated as a coherent unit under joint command.126 In addition,
organizing such forces-as well as having nations deploy such forces-
further delays resolution of the problem and makes Security Council
military action reliant upon the current political atmosphere of those
countries asked to donate forces.
A second difficulty resulting from the failure to implement Article
43 is that the Security Council is less likely to make findings of, or take
action against, international threats to peace when it lacks a ready means
121. See supra note 30.
122. See U.N. CHARTER art. 43, para. 1. R. HisCOCKS, supra note 99, at 75, 266.
The drafters envisioned an army composed of forces from all member states, con-
trolled by the Security Council, and utilized in cases of unilateral aggression by a
common enemy. The Charter was probably designed with a situation like Hitler's
unilateral aggression in mind.
123. An effort in 1946 failed due to squabbling. R. HIsCOCKS, supra note 99, at 72-
74. A mid-1960s effort was virtually abandoned by the early 1970s, despite the fact
that many nations had troops and supplies earmarked for U.N. service. Id. at 280.
Furthermore, the idea for a U.N. "Guard Force" began in 1948 and was abandoned,
due largely to Soviet opposition. G. BROWN, B. BARKER & T. BURKE, POLICE AS
PEACE-KEEPERS 4-5 (1984) [hereinafter G. BROWN].
124. See R. HiscocKs, supra note 99, at 266-67. For example, the U.N. Field Ser-
vice was established in 1949, yet by 1972 the entire force consisted of only 340 per-
sonnel. The Panel of Field Observers, also created in 1949, consists of 2,000
personnel and seldomly is utilized. Id. at 267-68.
125. Id. at 266. For example, the U.N. assembled its forces in Korea through a
recommendation by the Security Council that member states contribute forces.
126. For a list of the nations contributing military aid to the U.N. for use in the
Korean conflict, see 2 R. HIGGINS, UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING 1946-1967, 199-
210 (1970).
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of enforcement. 12 7 Also, absent a collective security system, it is not
politically feasible for the Security Council to order an enforcement
action.1 28 Indeed, some nations have argued that the Security Council
cannot even recommend an enforcement action until Article 43 is imple-
mented, although this view is not generally accepted.' 2 9 One final prob-
lem in the non-implementation of Article 43 is that parties will be less
likely to refer matters to the Security Council, believing the Security
Council cannot adequately resolve the conflict. Clearly, a permanent
international security force is needed.' 3 0
b. The Lack of a Collective Security Force as Applied to
Mozambique
While it seems unlikely that a major collective security force will be cre-
ated in the near future, many nations would probably be willing to con-
tribute to a United Nations force since they already support
Mozambique militarily. These forces would not necessarily be used
offensively13 1 or be engaged as combatants, thus minimizing domestic
political opposition to contributing to a United Nations force. There-
fore, while the problem of the lack of a collective security force will
probably not be solved in the near future, this problem may be over-
come in the case of Mozambique.
B. Hurdles to Military Intervention Common to Both the Security
Council and the General Assembly
1. Legal Basis for United Nations Military Intervention
United Nations military intervention can be divided into two categories:
peacekeeping and enforcement actions. 132 Each category presents par-
ticular legal and practical obstacles to its usage, but these difficulties can
be overcome in the case of Mozambique.
a. Peacekeeping Actions
One type of United Nations military intervention is a peacekeeping
action. Such an action is currently untenable, but certain modifications
in the situation in Mozambique could render it feasible. In a peacekeep-
127. S. D. BAILEY, THE PROCEDURE OF THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL 245 (2d ed.
1988); D. NICOL, THE UNITED NATIONS: TOWARDS GREATER EFFECTIVENESS 11
(1982) (quote by Jakobson). Some commentators argue that the Security Council
should respond to disputes with less concern about loss of prestige from possible
failure and more concern for the problem itself. See R. HIscocKs, supra note 99, at
432.
128. R. HIGGINS, supra note 126, at 176.
129. Id. at 176-77.
130. See R. HlscoCKs, supra note 99, at 276 (citing view of U Thant, former Secre-
tary-General of the U.N.); COMMISSION TO STUDY THE ORGANIZATION OF PEACE, supra
note 110, at 5, 86. A collective security force could only be established in a coopera-
tive political atmosphere. See R. HISCOCKS, supra note 99, at 276 (view of U Thant).
131. Peacekeeping forces generally use force only in self-defense. See infra note
135 and accompanying text.
132. See, e.g., Tickell, supra note 91, at 316; G. BROWN, supra note 123, at 3-6.
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ing action, 133 as opposed to an enforcement action, the United Nations
acts as an "impartial and uninvolved" peacemaker rather than as an
involved enforcer.13 4 The United Nations assists in the negotiation pro-
cess and generally uses force only in self-defense. 135
Peacekeeping forces have been created by both the General Assem-
bly and the Security Council, as each body has a distinct constitutional
basis for creating them. While peacekeeping forces were probably not
envisioned by the Charter's drafters, 136 their success has led to their
acceptance, even by the Soviet Union,' 37 which traditionally opposed
peacekeeping forces as a usurpation of Security Council power.' 38
(1) Constitutional Basis for Peacekeeping Forces
(a) Peacekeeping Forces Created by the General Assembly
There are at least two views on the constitutional basis of peacekeeping
missions created by the General Assembly. Under one view, the General
Assembly can establish peacekeeping forces with the consent of the
involved nations simply because nothing in the Charter prohibits it.139
Under a second view, Articles 10, 11, 14, and 22 provide a positive legal
basis for peacekeeping missions established by the General Assem-
bly.140 This second view also holds that the General Assembly can rec-
ommend but not order such measures;1 4 1 a belief that is almost
universally accepted. 142 The International Court of Justice has upheld
the General Assembly's power to create such forces based on specific
Charter provisions.1 43 Regardless of which interpretation is accepted,
there is little doubt of the General Assembly's authority to create
peacekeeping forces; thus the General Assembly would have a constitu-
tional basis for creating peacekeeping forces in Mozambique.
(b) Peacekeeping Forces Created by the Security Council
While the Security Council has rarely specified a legal basis for creating
peacekeeping forces, 144 it has apparently acted under both Chapter
133. The United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), created by the General
Assembly in response to the Suez Canal dispute in Egypt, was the first U.N.
peacekeeping force. Since the Suez Canal mission, both the Security Council and
the General Assembly have created peacekeeping forces. R. HIsCOCKS, supra note 99,
at 269.
134. G. BROWN, supra note 123, at 6.
135. R. HISCOCKS, supra note 99, at 116. The U.N. forces in the Congo were an
exception to this general rule.
136. Id.; Tickell, supra note 91, at 311.
137. Tickell, supra note 91, at 311.
138. R. HisCOCKS, supra note 99, at 271.
139. 1 R. HIGGINS, supra note 126, at 262.
140. U.N. CHARTER arts. 10, 11, 14, 22; 1 R. HIGGINS, supra note 126, at 262.
141. 1 R. HIGGINS, supra note 126, at 262.
142. See, e.g., Report of the Secretary-General, 36 YEARBOOK OF THE U.N. 6 (1982).
143. Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, para. 2, of the Charter),
1962 I.CJ. 151, 164 (Advisory Opinion July, 20, 1962).
144. 1 R. HIGGINS, supra note 126, at 144.
Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 24
VI145 and Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.1 4 6 An action
under Chapter VI requires the dispute to be "likely to endanger the
maintenance of international peace and security," 14 7 and empowers the
Security Council only to recommend the creation of forces. 148 By con-
trast, an action under Chapter VII requires the existence of a "threat to
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression."'149 The Security
Coucil, however, seldom makes such a formal finding prior to authoriz-
ing a peacekeeping mission.1 50 Under Chapter VII, the Security Coun-
cil can either recommend or order action.1 5 1
In the case of Mozambique, the Security Council could undoubtedly
authorize a peacekeeping mission. Such a mission, whether authorized
by the Security Council or the General Assembly, would face various
practical difficulties.
(2) Practical Difficulties with a Peacekeeping Mission in Mozambique
Despite the success of peacekeeping forces, a peacekeeping mission in
Mozambique would falter for numerous reasons unless current negotia-
tions prove fruitful. First, peacekeeping missions fixate the status
quo.1 52 This result is undesirable in Mozambique because the status
quo is intolerable. 15 3 Second, peacekeeping missions facilitate negotia-
tions, 15 4 but in Mozambique, FRELIMO refuses to legitimize RENAMO
by negotiating with them.' 5 5 Furthermore, if negotiations occurred,
RENAMO would probably demand power within the government of
Mozambique. If RENAMO is as brutal and unorganized as reports indi-
cate, giving the organization any control is unconscionable. Third,
peacekeeping missions generally require the objective nation's con-
sent.' 5 6 FRELIMO's refusal to negotiate with RENAMO indicates FRE-
LIMO probably would not permit an unbiased peacekeeping mission.
Indeed, Mozambique has made no request for forces. Finally, a United
Nations' peacekeeping mission would likely damage the reputation of
the United Nations because of the high probability of failure under the
current circumstances.
While a peacekeeping mission to Mozambique currently is untena-
ble, under certain conditions a mission could make sense. RENAMO
must prove itself less violent than reports indicate. A simple rebuttal of
145. 2 id. at 349 (citing the Security Council's creation of the United Nations Com-
mission on India and Pakistan).
146. 3 id. at 54 (citing creation of the United Nations peacekeeping mission in the
Congo).
147. U.N. CHARTER art. 33, para. 1.
148. See id. at art. 36, para. 1.
149. Id. at art. 39.
150. 4 R. HIGGINS, supra note 126, at 144.
151. See U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
152. Tickell, supra note 91, at 316.
153. Id.
154. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
155. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
156. See COMMISSION TO STUDY THE ORGANIZATION OF PEACE, supra note 110, at 87.
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these reports or an actual change in tactics could disprove RENAMO's
violent reputation. RENAMO would also have to demonstrate some for-
mal organization. A temporary cease-fire during negotiations could test
RENAMO's organization. Compliance with the cease-fire would estab-
lish that the guerrilla activities in Mozambique's rural areas are under
unified command. Furthermore, before a peacekeeping mission could
occur, FRELIMO must be willing to negotiate with RENAMO and
relinquish sole control of the government if necessary. The first two
conditions - RENAMO showing both less brutality and a genuine orga-
nizational structure - would make this third condition more likely.
Some of these conditions may be close to occurring, suggesting a
peacekeeping mission may soon become tenable. However, if current
talks collapse, then the United Nations may have to intervene through
an enforcement action.
b. Enforcement Actions
Enforcement actions are the second type of United Nations military
operation. The Korean conflict in the early 1950s is the only example of
an United Nations enforcement action. Thus, Korea uniquely demon-
strates the United Nations' use of military force "in a way envisaged by
the Charter." 157
Unlike peacekeeping missions, enforcement missions seemingly do
not require the consent of the disputing parties. 158 Enforcement
actions also do not involve neutral forces; instead, the United Nations
forces have a defined enemy. Furthermore, enforcement actions involve
offensive, rather than defensive, use of force. 159
Although the United Nations has rarely used an enforcement
action, "it may not be off [the agenda] forever."16 0 The Soviet Union
has shown a renewed interest in enforcement mechanisms, 16 ' and the
apparent end of cold war hostilities may lead to an increased spirit of
cooperation allowing the Security Council to preserve international
peace through enforcement actions.
(1) Constitutional Basis for Enforcement Actions
It is almost universally agreed that only the Security Council can author-
ize an enforcement action.1 6 2 This authorization is issued as either an
157. See, e.g., G. BROWN, supra note 123, at 5. The Security Council determined
that the invasion of South Korea by North Korea was a breach of the peace and
requested North Korea to withdraw its troops. North Korea ignored the resolution,
and the Security Council, in lieu of organizing a United Nations security force, rec-
ommended (through a resolution) that U.N. members aid South Korea. Soon there-
after, the Council established a unified command of forces under U.S. control. See
generally 2 R. HIGGINS, supra note 126, at 153.
158. Tickell, supra note 91, at 316.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. See, e.g., Certain Expenses of the United Nations, supra note 143, at 163.
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order 163 or a recommendation. 64 The threshold question 165 in deter-
mining whether the Security Council can recommend or mandate an
enforcement action is whether the situation involves, under Article 39, a
"threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression."'166 The
Charter does not define these terms, 167 but it is almost beyond dispute
that they refer to threats, breaches, and aggression of an international
nature. 168
An "act of aggression" has a different meaning than a "threat to the
peace, [or] breach of the peace."' 69 The General Assembly has defined
an act of aggression as one state's unlawful use of force against another
state, regardless of either state's membership status in the United
Nations or recognition as a sovereign state by the international commu-
nity.170 An insurgency within a state is not an "act of aggression,"' 17 1
although foreign aid to an insurgency may be considered an "act of
aggression" by the foreign state1 72
It is unclear whether an "act of aggression" has occured in
Mozambique. While South Africa has aided RENAMO in the past,' 73
evidence of current South African support is probably insufficient to jus-
tify Security Council military intervention. Moreover, RENAMO's
designation as a state within the meaning of Article 39 is doubtful, 174 so
RENAMO's activity could not in itself be considered an "act of aggres-
sion." Thus, because evidence does not clearly establish an "act of
aggression," the situation in Mozambique must involve a "threat to the
peace" or "breach of the peace" if the United Nations is to undertake an
enforcement action.
Unlike the term "act of aggression," the General Assembly has not
defined the phrase "threat to the peace, [or] breach of the peace."
163. Id.
164. The only enforcement action authorized by the Security Council was issued as
a recommendation. It stated: "[The Security Council] recommends that the Mem-
bers of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be
necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in
the area." 16 U.N. SCOR (474th mtg.) at 4, U.N. Doc. S/PV. 474 (1950).
165. See 2 R. HIGGINS, supra note 126, at 176.
166. U.N. CHARTER, art. 39.
167. A. M. RIFAAT, INTERNATIONAL AGGRESSION 122 (1979).
168. See, e.g., 2 R. HIGGINS, supra note 126, at 28 (quoting a former Security Coun-
cil representative: "Under Article 39 we are alleging a breach of peace .... [W]e
assume that this means a breach of international peace .... ).
169. See A. M. RiFAAT, supra note 167, at 122. An act of aggression seems to be,
under current interpretation, a sufficient but not a necessary condition for finding a
threat to peace.
170. Id. at 315.
171. Id. at 317.
172. Id. (suggesting that a just and lawful insurgency-as determined by the
U.N.-may be able to recieve aid without the grantor being termed an aggressor);
Matheson, Practical Considerations for the Development of Legal Standards for Intervention, 13
GA.J. INT'L & COMP. L. 205 (1983) (speech).
173. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
174. SeeJ. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER, & N. LEECH, supra note 82, at 852 (citing Restate-
ment § 201).
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Indeed, there are no sharply defined legal standards to guide the Secur-
ity Council in determining whether a "threat to the peace, [or] breach of
the peace" exists. 17 5 Instead, the Security Council's decisions are based
on vague, political factors articulated in its past decisions. 17 6 One sig-
nificant factor in previous decisions is the "size and intensity" of a con-
flict. 177 Other factors include the existence and extent of foreign aid to
states or organizations in the conflict, the legitimacy of the state or
organization receiving aid, and whether the state requested that aid. 178
The dispute may also become internationalized when refugee problems
or acts of violence occur in neighboring states due to a state's internal
dispute.' 7 9 Finally, gross human rights violations may make a conflict
international in character.18 0
Numerous factors make the dispute in Mozambique a breach of
international peace. First, the refugee spillover is immense, and neigh-
boring states may be unable to provide basic necessities for the refu-
gees. 18 1 Second, the fighting may soon spread to neighboring states. 18 2
Third, numerous states continue to give military aid to both factions.18 3
Fourth, RENAMO's brutality, and the fighting in general, have created a
human rights situation some liken to a holocaust. ' 84 Fifth, governments
and international organizations give Mozambique great sums of money
for humanitarian aid, which is threatened by RENAMO.18 5 Finally, an
insurgency that continues for a decade and generates almost four mil-
lion refugees must necessarily have international effects detrimental to
international peace. Thus, the threshold requirement for an enforce-
ment action - a "threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression" - exists in Mozambique.
A second important issue in enforcement actions is whether an
enforcement action can occur against states, governments, or organiza-
tions that the international community or the United Nations do not for-
mally recognize. Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter does not
limit enforcement actions only to recognized states.' 8 6 Many civil wars
involve organizations not recognized, yet civil wars can clearly threaten
international peace.' 8 7 Given the increasingly internal nature of armed
disputes and because a non-recognized organization is able to disrupt
international peace to the same extent as a recognized state, it would be
175. Szasz, Role of the United Nations in Internal Conflicts, 13 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
345, 351 (1983).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 347.
178. Id. at 347-48.
179. Id. at 348-49.
180. Id. at 350.
181. See T. BRENNAN, supra note 4, at 16-24.
182. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 26, 31, 44-48 and accompanying text.
184. Vonnegut, supra note 49, at 17.
185. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
186. 2 R. HIGGINS, supra note 126, at 176.
187. Id.
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untenable to view the Security Council impotent to undertake an
enforcement action against a non-recognized organization. In
Mozambique, RENAMO's non-recognition by most of the international
community should not affect the Security Council's power to initiate an
enforcement action.
Another enforcement action issue for the Security Council is
whether its recommendation or mandate depends on the fulfillment of
Article 43's call for the creation of a collective security force. While
some nations believe a collective security force is a condition for an
enforcement action, 188 a majority of nations believe that the implemen-
tation of Article 43 is not legally required.' 89 Failure to implement Arti-
cle 43 suggests, however, that politically an enforcement action could
not be ordered, only recommended.19 0 This apparent limitation may be
irrelevant because once the Security Council approves an enforcement
action at least nine states would likely be willing to contribute forces to
such a mission. 19 1 In addition, the Security Council probably would not
issue orders, but rather achieve implementation through
recommendations.
Thus, the Security Council clearly could find a constitutional basis
for an enforcement action in Mozambique, leaving practical difficulties
as the larger hurdle to such action.
(2) Practical Difficulties with an Enforcement Action in Mozambique
An enforcement action in Mozambique would involve various practical
difficulties, but these difficulties could be overcome. One problem with
enforcement actions is cost, which can be measured both economically,
and by the loss of life. A nation's role in an enforcement action, how-
ever, could be limited to donating weapons, training, and strategic lead-
ership, rather than combat troops. A second problem with enforcement
actions is the lack of precedent for such limited involvement. However,
a renewed interest in reviving enforcement mechanisms' 9 2 may over-
come this problem. A third difficulty is that the United Nations would
be forced to side with either FRELIMO or RENAMO, and almost surely
would choose FRELIMO. 193 Aiding FRELIMO, however, would put the
United Nations in a position of fighting for a non-democratic organiza-
tion against a group that at least purports to be in favor of establishing a
democracy. Perhaps the United Nations could overcome this dilemma
by conditioning military intervention on FRELIMO's promise to work
toward democracy.
188. Id. at 176-77.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 176.
191. Passing a proposal takes nine affirmative votes. U.N. CHARTER art. 27, paras.
2,3.
192. See supra note 160-61 and accompanying text.
193. No precedent exists for the Security Council allowing an enforcement action
against a recognized nation to protect an unrecognized group.
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2. The Article 2 Domestic Jurisdiction Hurdle
Article 2, paragraph 7 (hereinafter "Article 2") is particularly important
in civil disputes because it attempts to define the extent to which the
United Nations can intervene in a country's internal affairs. The Arti-
cle's language is open-ended and leaves much uncertainty as to the lim-
its of the United Nations' intervention power, military or otherwise.
This ambiguity reduces the likelihood of United Nations intervention in
questionable cases.
In the Mozambican conflict, Article 2 could be interpreted to allow
for military intervention; indeed, this interpretation would be in accord
with the views of some commentators. 19 4 Mozambique exemplifies the
necessity of giving a broad and concrete interpretation to the United
Nations' power to intervene in civil wars.
a. Overview
The United Nations Charter was designed primarily in response to
major acts of aggression that clearly crossed international borders.1 95
Currently, aggression is increasingly internal and often funded by for-
eign states which do not directly participate in the conflict. Indeed,
most violence in the post-Charter years has resulted from either "civil or
mixed civil-international conflict." 1 9 6 "[O]ne of the greatest challenges
to the United Nations system for control of coercion in the world [is] the
problem of intervention and counter-intervention in internal con-
flicts."1 19 7 The Security Council must interpret Articles 2 and 39 of the
Charter, which bear on the problem of civil and mixed civil-international
conflicts, to give the United Nations a role in ending such conflicts.
These articles raise a number of legal questions. Article 2 states:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United
Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such mat-
ters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not
prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter
VII. 198
Chapter VII, Article 39, states:
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recom-
mendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with
Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and
security.199
194. See Moore, Legal Standards for Intervention in Internal Conflicts, 13 GA. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 191, 193-94 (1983) (speech).
195. Id.
196. Id. at 191.
197. Id.
198. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7.
199. Id art. 39.
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Article 2 raises questions as to what constitutes "matters which are
essentially within ... domestic jurisdiction" and how this relates to the
exception to Article 2-"enforcement measures under Chapter VII." A
related jurisdictional issue is what constitutes a "threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression" under Article 39.200 An Arti-
cle 39 finding is required for the Security Council to undertake an
enforcement action and would justify an enforcement action under the
Article 2 exception.
The primary legal question under Article 2 is what constitutes a
"matter . . .essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state."
The United Nations has never formally defined this phrase. The Inter-
national Court of Justice has addressed Article 2 issues but has left its
precise definition an open question.20 Member nations and commenta-
tors have advanced at least three interpretations of this phrase.202
One interpretation is that once the United Nations considers an
issue, the issue is no longer essentially within a state's domestic jurisdic-
tion under Article 2.203 This view is untenable because it is absurd to
believe any nation would condone such a limited view of domestic
jurisdiction. 20 4
A second interpretation is that any dispute involving a threat to
international peace is not "essentially within . . .domestic jurisdic-
tion."120 5 Under this view, the Security Council can intervene without
violating Article 2 once it finds a threat to international peace. The Gen-
eral Assembly, in accordance with its secondary role as international
peacekeeper, could also respond to a threat to international peace with-
out violating Article 2.
A third interpretation of Article 2 is that even a threat to interna-
tional peace does not necessarily take a dispute out of a state's jurisdic-
tion. 20 6 In other words, a dispute can disrupt international peace yet
still be essentially domestic within the meaning of Article 2. Under this
view, the United Nations' authority to intervene is in Article 2's final
phrase, which creates a specific exception in the case of a Chapter VII
enforcement action.20 7 The Security Council has exclusive authority to
make a finding under Article 39 and mandate an enforcement action
under Chapter VII. Thus, only the Security Council can mandate an
enforcement action in the case of a domestic dispute that disrupts inter-
national peace.
Given that the Security Council's determination as to the existence
200. See supra notes 175-80 and accompanying text.
201. See Certain Expenses of the United Nations, supra note 143, at 196-97 (sepa-
rate opinion of Sir Percy Spender).
202. Szasz, supra note 175, at 345-54.
203. Id. at 346.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 346-47.
206. Id. at 352-53.
207. Id.
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of a threat to international peace is an issue subject to veto,208 and given
the Security Council's difficulty in overcoming the veto problem, 20 9 the
United Nations is unlikely to intervene in civil disputes if it adopts the
third interpretation of Article 2. Indeed, even peacekeeping missions-
the most common type of United Nations military intervention-seem to
exceed the authority of the United Nations when the dispute threatens
international peace but is essentially domestic. 210 As a practical matter,
however, a peacekeeping mission generally requires the host state's con-
sent, making an Article 2 objection by that state unlikely. 211 Conse-
quently, the third interpretation of Article 2 may not necessarily prevent
United Nations intervention through a peacekeeping mission. 212 In
summary, the third interpretation of Article 2 imposes serious political
obstacles that make United Nations intervention less likely than under
the second interpretation.
Unlike the third interpetation, the second interpretation of Article 2
views threats to international peace as necessarily outside a state's
domestic jurisdiction. Therefore, the General Assembly has a greater
responsibility in solving civil and civil-international conflicts and could
freely authorize United Nations intervention. Under the second inter-
pretation, United Nations military intervention would be less vulnerable
to legal criticisms and each intervention would act as a valuable prece-
dent for future United Nations intervention.
The second interpretation, however, has been criticized. Critics
argue that this approach accepts the Security Council's impotence,
ignores the benefits of the veto, and allows the General Assembly to
intervene in predominently domestic conflicts. 213 From a practical
standpoint, these criticisms may not be problematic. Given the success
and limited intrusiveness of General Assembly peacekeeping mis-
208. T. S. BATRA, supra note 110, at 31.
209. See supra notes 108-20 and accompanying text.
210. Under Article 2, paragraph 7, a matter essentially within a state's domesticjurisdiction is outside of U.N. jurisdiction except in the case of enforcement actions
pursuant to Chapter VII. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7. A peacekeeping action is
not an enforcement action under Chapter VII. See supra notes 139-40, 146 and
accompanying text.
211. Certain Expenses of the United Nations, supra note 143, at 297 (dissent of
Judge Bustamante).
As to the principle of non-intervention in matters within domestic jurisdic-
tion, it is beyond dispute that the Organization has not in fact committed any
infringment in the case of the Congo, since it was the Government of that
State which, on its own initiative, asked for the assistance of the United
Nations.
Id.
212. This interpretation of Article 2, paragraph 7, raises questions as to whether
U.N. members are required to contribute funds to such actions. It is questionable
whether a U.N. member should be forced to pay the U.N. to help a nation with essen-
tially domestic matters. See generally id Furthermore, consent to U.N. intervention
arguably does not remove a matter from a state's domestic affairs; thus, U.N. inter-
vention might be ultra vires (due to Article 2, paragraph 7, despite the host state's
consent).
213. Id.
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sions, 2 14 the missions should be utilized in as many situations as possi-
ble that threaten international peace under the language of the Charter.
Another criticism of the second interpretation of Article 2 is that it
renders the exception to Article 2 superfluous. If a breach of interna-
tional peace takes a dispute outside a state's domestic jurisdiction, then
the Security Council could legally initiate a Chapter VII enforcement
action without considering the Article 2 exception. This criticism is
based upon the principle of statutory interpretation which says that a
statute should be interpreted so as not to render a clause useless. 2 15
There are three responses to the criticism concerning the superflu-
ity of Article 2's exception. First, at some point practical concerns
supercede maxims of interpretation, especially on an issue as important
as international peace. Second, the exception to Article 2 may be viewed
as a reassurance that Article 2 does not impair United Nations action
when a situation merits an enforcement action. Finally, Article 39 may
be interpreted as giving the Security Council authority to react to any
breach of the peace, regardless of whether the breach is international in
scope. Such an interpretation, while not generally accepted, is feasible,
because Article 39 does not specify that breaches must be international.
While Article 39 has been interpreted to require an international
breach, the fact that the language of Article 39 does not explicitly state
such a requirement renders the exception to Article 2 quite relevant.
For if Article 39 would allow the Security Council to authorize an
enforcement action against a threat to peace that is not international,
Article 2 would certainly preclude an enforcement action if not for the
exception.
Thus, the criticisms of Article 2's second interpretation can be over-
come. The benefits of the second interpretation far outweigh its draw-
backs and the U.N. should adopt it.
b. Article 2 as Applied to Mozambique
The first question in determining whether Article 2 would prevent
United Nations military intervention in Mozambique is whether the dis-
pute is essentially within Mozambique's domestic jurisdiction. Under
the second interpretation of Article 2, the dispute would not be essen-
tially within Mozambique's domestic jurisdiction because the dispute
disrupts international peace.2 16 Thus either the Security Council or the
General Assembly could authorize military intervention without violat-
ing Article 2. Under the third interpretation, however, it is uncertain
whether the matter is essentially within Mozambique's domestic jurisdic-
214. Peacekeeping missions generally require the host state's consent. See supra
note 156. U.N. peacekeeping forces will typically use force only in self-defense, see
supra note 135, and will attempt to act in an impartial and uninvolved manner. See
supra note 134 and accompanying text.
215. See, e.g., Town of Milton v. Metropolitan Dist. Commission, 172 N.E. 2d 696, 342
Mass. 222 (1961).
216. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
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tion. Although the Security Council could clearly initiate an enforce-
ment action based on the Article 2 exception, it is unclear whether a
peacekeeping action could occur without violating Article 2 and whether
member states would have a legal obligation to contribute funds.2 17
Mozambique presents a situation that demonstrates why the United
Nations should adopt the second interpretation of Article 2. This inter-
pretation would give the Security Council and the General Assembly a
strong legal basis for interventing in internationally disruptive civil con-
flicts like the one in Mozambique.
3. Lack of Confidence in the United Nations as a Hurdle
a. Overview
The international community's confidence in the Security Council and
the United Nations greatly affects the United Nations' effectiveness. An
improved attitude towards the United Nations would lessen many of the
Security Council's problems, especially the veto problem, 21 8 the finance
problem, 2 19 and possibly the collective security system problem. 220
The international community's lack of support for and confidence in the
United Nations is arguably the United Nations' most serious
problem. 2 2 1
The lack of confidence and support for the United Nations
manifests itself in numerous ways. First, certain matters that clearly con-
cern international peace and security are not placed on the Security
Council's agenda. When states lack confidence in the United Nations,
they are likely to resort to regional organizations or unilateral action.2 22
Second, the United Nations requires financial support, and lack of confi-
dence leads to insufficient funding. Finally, a collective security system
will not develop if nations lack confidence in the United Nations. Thus,
without increased confidence in and support for the United Nations,
both it and especially the Security Council are likely to remain underutil-
ized, underfunded, and unable to implement an enforcement
mechanism.
b. Intervention in Mozambique Enhancing Confidence in the United
Nations
While the current lack of confidence in the United Nations is a major
hurdle to United Nations action in Mozambique, United Nations inter-
vention could build confidence in the United Nations and the Security
Council and encourage their future use. Indeed, nations will not respect
217. See supra note 212.
218. See supra notes 108-20 and accomanying text.
219. See infra note 223-24 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 122-30.
221. See,'e.g., S. D. BAILEY, supra note 127, at 7 (statement of former U.S. Ambassa-
dor Charles Yost) ("I do not think the fault [of the Security Council] really lies pri-
marily in the Charter. I think it lies in the policies of the various governments.").
222. R. HiscocKs, supra note 99, at 190.
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the United Nations if it does not act. Only through confident action can
the United Nations begin to approach the degree of effectiveness envi-
sioned by its creators.
4. Lack of Financial Support as a Hurdle
a. Overview
The United Nations' lack of funds is a serious problem. The Security
Council requires large sums of money, especially if it is to develop a
collective security system. Nations, especially the U.S., 2 23 have been in
arrears on United Nations dues, and the international community has
generally been "extraordinarily niggardly in providing money for inter-
national purposes. '22 4
b. Financial Resources and Intervention in Mozambique
The current lack of financial resources is a major hurdle to United
Nations action in Mozambique. Given that many nations currently pro-
vide financial support to Mozambique and that Mozambique's need
would likely diminish once the insurgency ends, it might be economi-
cally efficient to invest in ending the insurgency. Furthermore, a suc-
cessful United Nations mission in Mozambique would generate
confidence in the United Nations and encourage greater financial sup-
port for the United Nations in the future.
Conclusion
Civil conflicts may present grave threats to world peace. If the United
Nations is ever to achieve its function as a major force for world peace,
the United Nations Charter must be interpreted to give the United
Nations broad powers to intervene in civil conflicts that threaten inter-
national peace. Furthermore, United Nations military action in such
conflicts would symbolize international cooperation and build faith in
the United Nations as a force for peace. Given the recent decline in
tensions between East and West, and the increased interest in utilizing
the Security Council, the United Nations appears ready to begin fulfil-
ling its intended role.
If, as expected, the conflict in Mozambique continues, the United
Nations should fulfil its duty as world peacekeeper through military
intervention. The conflict has led to a breach of international peace and
a dreadful human rights situation, thus justifying United Nations inter-
vention. And even if the Mozambican conflict ends without United
Nations intervention, earlier United Nations involvement may have
shortened the conflict and reduced its devastating consequences.
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